The Role of Managers in Enacting Two-Step Institutional Work for Radical Innovation in Professional Organizations

Introduction
Studies of innovation highlight the role of managers: they outline the strategic intent of innovation, facilitate adoption of new practices, grant autonomy to frontline employees to pursue radical innovation, and design appropriate incentives to stimulate creativity (O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006; Hidalgo and Albors, 2008; Poskela and Martinsuo, 2009 ).
However, in professional organizations, the role of managers in developing and implementing innovation differs (Von Nordenflycht, 2010) since frontline employees are professionals that possess expert knowledge that is heavily regulated and inaccessible to managers. As a consequence, it is frontline professionals, not managers, that control the design and implementation of radical innovation. They may do so in a way that proves undesirable for managers. For example, because radical innovation may undermine professional boundaries and change longstanding professional practice, frontline professionals may actively work to preserve the status quo (Barczak et al., 2006; O'Connor and DeMartino, 2006; Hoegl et al., 2007; Glynn et al., 2010) ,. Under such conditions, managers may 'only' be supporting actors, who facilitate professional decision-making (Currie and Procter, 2005; Llewellyn, 2001 ), or they avoid engaging professionals with anything more than incremental innovation (Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Vermeulen et al., 2007; Lewin and Reeves, 2011; Currie et al., 2012) . Addressing this challenge, our study reveals how managers engage and shape the efforts of highly-expert and autonomous professionals towards radical innovation.
Theoretically, the challenge for managers in introducing radical innovation is an institutional one. Professionals defend established boundaries and practices by reinforcing the regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive arrangements in their organizations; i.e. the established rules, social expectations and logics of actions. In professional contexts, these three arrangements consolidate into 'institutional pillars' (Scott, 2001 ) and produce stabilizing effects towards replication and reinforcement, rather than revision, of established professional boundaries and practices (Suddaby and Viale, 2011; Muzio et al., 2015) . To realize radical innovation in professional organizations then, managers must act upon institutional pillars.
Extant literature tends to emphasize the top-down effect of institutional pillars upon innovation (e.g., Van Dijk et al., 2011; Yang and Wang, 2013; Shu et al., 2015) . In contrast, our study draws upon the concept of 'institutional work': "the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting [regulative, normative and cognitive foundations of] institutions" (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; p. 216) . Through focusing upon institutional work, the study asks: how do managers act upon institutional pillars through institutional work to influence professional organization towards radical innovation?
To address this research question empirically, a comparative case study of radical innovation in 12 Italian hospitals was enacted to examine the interaction of executive and middle managers with elite, high-status professionals (i.e., doctors) in the introduction of radically new integrated service reconfiguration. This dilutes professional boundaries and changes longstanding professional practice, and so exemplifies our theoretical concerns through impacting regulative, normative and cognitive institutional pillars.
This article proceeds as follows. Within the literature review, the institutional perspective is detailed by focusing on both the structures and possibilities for agency. Then, a description of the research setting and design is presented. Data are shown by clustering the empirical cases: management holding back from radical innovation (cluster 1); management organizing for innovation through centralized projects (cluster 2); management organizing for innovation through political work (cluster 3); management organizing for innovation through two-step institutional work (cluster 4). Within the discussion, a comparative analysis is presented.
Finally, in conclusion, the theoretical contribution to understanding managers' role in radical innovation within professional organizations is emphasized, practical implications outlined, and further research suggested.
An institutional perspective on radical innovation in professional organizations
Institutional theory conceives professional organizations as characterized by three institutional 'pillars' (Scott, 2001) , which cause actors to shy away from radical innovation.
Regulative elements establish rules to which actors should conform; normative elements introduce a prescriptive and evaluative dimension in social life, representing how actors should behave appropriately; and cultural-cognitive elements relate to shared conceptions of what constitutes the social reality, and how actors should evaluate behaviors. These pillars produce stabilizing effects in the organization, aligning the behaviors of embedded actors towards the replication of enduring social structures and systems, thus engendering isomorphism and path dependence. Radical innovation emerges only when the stabilizing effects of institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs are breached.
These breaches are defined 'micro-institutional affordances', from which organizational actors become more aware and tolerant of radical changes (Van Dijk et al., 2011) . Three phenomena are likely to generate breaches. First, increase in multiplicity of institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs co-existing in the organization, raises actors' awareness of a need for change (Reay and Hinings, 2009 ). Second, heterogeneity of organizational groups with distinct interests, norms and beliefs raises actors' awareness that radical change might appease stakeholders' demands (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2011) . Third, ambiguity of institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs, raises actors' awareness that a radical change could help restore clarity (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) . Micro-institutional affordances hence represent situations in which compliance to established rules and social norms, as well as the commitment to established values, interests and belief systems, is challenged, either because their interpretation is more ambiguous or because new interests, norms and beliefs become more relevant. So, embedded actors are more tolerant of, and predisposed towards, radical change (Lawrence et al., 2013) .
To take advantage of micro-institutional affordances, actors can engage in institutional work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006 (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2011) .
Professionals usually have the upper hand in relation to managers because they possess expert knowledge required to develop and deliver products/services and accordingly have autonomy to choose when and how to engage with radical innovation (Abbott, 1988) . Their institutional work defends this right and shapes the nature and extent of radical innovation (Suddaby and Viale, 2011; Currie et al., 2012) . Professionals' institutional work revolves around shaping inter-professional boundaries that establish how professionals are connected and practices that establish what professionals should do in their jobs (Ackroyd and Muzio, 2007) . Boundaries and practices are connected in a recursive relation: boundaries delimit the sets of practices that embedded actors pursue, while practices support specific boundary arrangements (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010) . Accordingly, professionals neutralize the 'threat' of radical innovation by reinforcing boundaries and thus protecting their selfregulation and exclusive jurisdiction (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Suddaby and Viale, 2011) . In operating "boundary maintenance around the differential areas of expertise associated with their work" (Llewellyn, 2001, p. 595) , professionals perform technical work and cultural work to reinforce the normative/cognitive foundations of their claims (Micelotta and Washington, 2013) .
Executive managers may attempt to enact institutional work such as: 'undermining the moral foundations' of professionals' autonomy; 'theorizing' cause-effect chains related to performance management and measurement systems; developing rules systems that change the status of marginalized organizational actors or create hierarchies ('defining'); diverting resources and property rights across professional groups ('vesting'); introducing auditing and monitoring mechanisms ('policing') (See Table 1 ). These attempts, however, all struggle to produce change without support from professionals (Suddaby and Viale, 2011; Currie et al., 2012; Muzio et al., 2013) .
Meanwhile, middle managers face an even bleaker outlook regarding their role in radical innovation, with little evidence that they can successfully enact institutional work. Generalist (without a professional background) middle managers are not commonly characterized as institutional actors that drive radical change in professional organizations. Their role is one of a supporting cast confined to facilitating strategic change or innovation within established institutional pillars (Wooldridge et al., 2008) . Thus, how executive managers and generalist middle managers contribute to challenging institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs of professionals is unclear, as attempts to introduce radical innovation unfold. Following which, to repeat our research question: how do managers act upon institutional pillars through institutional work to influence professional organization towards radical innovation?
Research Design
The Empirical Case
The study investigated the attempts of executive and middle managers in 12 Italian hospitals to enable the creation of radically new services for complex care patients. The choice of the empirical setting, Italian hospitals, is shaped by our theoretical concerns. Hospitals have long been privileged contexts to induce theory about change and innovation in professional contexts from an institutional perspective. Specifically, institutional accounts of change within hospitals highlights the significance of their underpinning institutional pillars, which renders maintenance of the status quo more likely than radical innovation taking hold (Reay et al., 2006; Currie et al., 2012) . This empirical setting thus represents an extreme context from which to induce theory. (Adler and Kwon, 2013) , by standardizing care processes and therapy and diagnosis criteria. Second, they challenged institutionalized reliance on tacit 'mindlines' derived from early training and socialization, where doctors draw on experiential or more intuitive knowledge in diagnosing and managing patients (Gabbay and LeMay, 2004) . Now decision-making was based on more formal clinical evidence. Finally, they reshaped inter-professional boundaries, requiring experts with different roles and backgrounds to interact in multidisciplinary teams, disclosing their knowledge to others, sharing decision-making, so conceding a portion of their autonomy to peers (Lewin and Reeves, 2011) .
Data Gathering
Data was collected from October 2011 to September 2012 across 12 comparative cases.
Initially, within the Italian healthcare context, exploratory interviews were undertaken with managers in 20 hospitals, identified as high-performing organizations through publicly available 'league tables' of quality of their services. Then, hospitals with comparable quality were selected, as variations in this indicator could introduce confounding explanations in our study. In this exploratory stage, within some identifiably high-performing hospitals, managers knew little about integrated service, nor had they any thoughts about its implementation, so these hospitals were excluded from further analysis. Thus 12 highperforming hospitals were identified that were active with plans for integrated services, but not necessarily committed to their implementation in the short-term. Some reported systemwide integrated care, while at the other end others reported they were not progressing integrated services in the face of potential resistance. Such varied responses aligned with our concern to explain managers' institutional work in seeking to drive reform.
Across the 12 hospitals, a comparative case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989 ) was taken to examine the (re)design of complex care services according to principles of integrated care.
A substantial archive of documents around the redesign of frontline services and ICP application was initially gathered. These documents provided evidence on the extent of service redesign, criteria to assess clinical outcomes, and degree of implementation.
Documents relating to organizational strategies and policies for ICPs were collected along with scientific articles in national and international journals, reports on ICP development, ICP presentations for internal meetings, workshops or conferences, newsletters and leaflets on hospital intranet or websites. These documents were subjected to data analysis along with interview transcripts.
As the documentary analysis was insufficient to detail how ICPs were developed and implemented, interviews with key informants became the primary source of data. General middle managers in quality departments were first approached, as they were responsible in each of the empirical cases for supporting service redesign through ICPs, to deepen access to the 12 in-depth cases. Following this, the main actors involved in the innovation process were identified and interviewed; i.e., executive managers (CEOs, Medical Directors, R&D Directors), general middle managers in the Quality Departments, and doctors.
The interviews took place in two phases, across the first six sites, and then followed later with interviews in a second group of six sites. One of the researchers undertaking interviews, asked about actions stimulating service redesign, the key interactions between actors as service was redesigned, and perceived factors affecting radical innovation. Following
Mantere's (2008) approach, interviews were semi-structured to allow a "story-telling approach that is, to let the interviewees describe their views as freely as possible, allowing them to interpret the questions freely and pursue those themes that they regarded as central" (p. 298). In total, 60 informants in 12 hospitals were interviewed, on average for one hour.
Supplementary field notes kept track of in-field observations, such as interactions between managers and doctors in departmental meetings (50 hours of observation). Table 2 provides an overview of the research phases, hospitals involved and research instruments for the various activities.
<<Table 2 about here>>
In the analysis, one of the researchers (conducting the fieldwork) initially coded data, while others acted as external investigators, developing theory 'from outside' through independent within-case and cross-case analyses, to reach a common theoretical understanding of institutional work enacted around radical innovation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mantere, 2008) .
Triangulation across analysts was performed to identify clusters of cases, as only one of the four authors had been involved in data collection, hence the remaining authors were able to challenge and interrogate derivation of clusters by the fieldworker (Mantere et al., 2012) .
In outline, in successive stages of analysis, the intention was to move from a descriptive, empirical to an interpretive, more theoretical mode of explanation for the patterns of innovation induced across the comparative case data. The final step of the analysis involved categorization of the broader explanatory categories that were more empirically oriented into aggregated theoretical categories (types of institutional work and by whom), with consideration for how they linked to each other; e.g. how different actors' institutional work, when considered together, produced (or did not produce) a radical innovation effect (Pratt et al., 2006) .
Following such analysis, the authors agreed to group the 12 cases in four clusters: (i) no management initiative: 4 cases where managers disengaged from radical innovation due to professional resistance; (ii) organizing for radical innovation through a centralized project: 4 cases where managers coordinated service redesign through the adoption of a standardized ICP format and the supervision of project teamwork; (iii) organizing for radical innovation through political work: 2 cases where managers carried out 'political work' aimed at introducing new regulations and incentives; (iv) organizing for radical innovation through cross-level institutional work: 2 cases where early adopters and managers carried out 'technical work', 'cultural work' and 'political work' to stimulate service redesign. In each cluster, cases were compared to identify common patterns, elucidating a general explanatory model and delineating differences regarding how specific factors triggered diverse outcomes.
To assess the degree of 'success' in each cluster, the number of 'original' service redesigns informed by ICPs and the number of departments involved (to measure the extent of changes)
were considered, along with the perceived radicalness of the ICPs and the degree of their implementation in practice (both informed by clinical informants). The cases ranged from (i) cases of zero radical service redesign attempted, with no instance of ICP adoption (i.e.
Black), to one case of more than 30 service redesigns informed by ICPs, whose degree of implementation was confirmed by the institutionalization of new structures (i.e. Cicero). This analysis provided a general model explaining how variations in organizing radical innovation through ICPs related to the roles and institutional work of executive managers, middle managers and professionals, which is outlined in Figure 1 . Table 1 , column 3 highlights examples of institutional work enacted in the selected cases by managers. Further detail about managers' institutional work is provided below. The combination of different institutional arrangements and institutional work led to specific outcomes for each cluster. Terms in italics within empirical sections refer to forms of institutional work enacted in the cases. Table 3 provides a summary of institutional work within each cluster. In Cluster 1 cases (column 2, Table 3 ), institutionalized interests, norms and values worked against radical service redesign, the latter which was generally perceived as a low priority or clinically inappropriate. There was little evidence of institutional work enacted by managers. More institutional work was enacted by professionals for maintenance purposes around institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs. Quality managers who held an interest in ICPs felt "between a hammer and the anvil" (Black, Quality Manager). ICP development was then left to the spontaneous efforts of professionals and remained sporadic.
Findings
The limited involvement of executive managers is a sore point for us. We cannot get ICPs into their heads no matter how we try. For them, ICPs are not a priority and the time is not right to put the delicate equilibrium between clinical departments at risk. So, ICPs depend on doctors, who tend their own garden (Winter, Quality Manager).
Since managers' institutional work was absent in Cluster 1, the empirical presentation will focus in the following sections upon case Clusters 2, 3 and 4, with particular detail provided about our exemplar Cluster 4 cases.
Cluster 2: Organizing for radical innovation through a centralized project
The Cluster 2 cases were also characterized by institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs preserving compartmentalized services and imbuing skepticism towards standardized care.
To illustrate our theoretical analysis, our empirical presentation focuses upon the case of Green (see Table 3 , Column 3, for combined analysis across Cluster 2 cases).
In Green, managers felt opposition from the 'old guard'; i.e., senior doctors controlling key departments. At Green, two events produced micro-institutional affordances. First, the retirement of several key players in the 'old guard' weakened opposition to service redesign. The new 'young guns' looked forward to integrated care as an opportunity to improve effectiveness of care and at the same time, their own legitimacy.
The new generation of doctors has very different training, sometimes from other hospitals. They saw ICPs and protocols with less blood in their eyes… Plus, they were filling big shoes, so they were eager to put their names on some important changes. (Green, Quality Manager)
Second, managers in Green initiated a major hospital redesign whereby space was opened up and clinical departments co-located. The "restructuring of the walls" (Green, Quality Manager) was appreciated by clinical departments since the previous geographical dispersion had the downside of "too much isolation" (Green, Doctor). Professionals agreed that "it was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity" (Green, Doctor) to improve clinical services and interdepartmental relationships. In response to this, professionals liaised with managers during the hospital reconfiguration to understand how they could revise their services. In doing so, they showed managers that they had become more tolerant of process re-engineering approaches.
We reached breaking point, so we welcomed the relocation plans. We had to drive to any meeting. It became unbearable with our schedule. At that point, we had to change something in our services, so we asked for help from managers (Green, Doctor) .
Managers in Green became conscious that pressures to preserve the status quo had weakened. They did not pursue institutional work to revise established regulations, norms and cultural frameworks. Rather, they identified professional groups interested in ICP development, and supported them through a centralized project management approach. When supported by professionals, middle managers suggested the adoption of ICP formats and co-produced an in-house ICP methodology. Guided by this, professionals collected evidence to inform their decision-making, and produced illustrations of their ICP experiences for others to read. The extent to which ICP development informed radical service innovation was however questionable since professionals (i) interpreted ICP development only as a research or experimental endeavor, without altering their practices; (ii) replicated their compartmentalized decision-making in teams and hence produced ICPs which reinforced established boundaries, and produced only incremental innovation; (iii) developed radical innovation only in relatively 'marginal' services with few patients and resources. As a consequence, at Green, there was a need for sustained administrative work by quality managers, which cast doubt on the long-term future of ICP development. In summary, at Green, as with other cases in this cluster (see Table 3 , Column 3), an absence of institutional work by managers left aspirations for sustaining any radical innovation unfulfilled. In Cluster 3 cases, detailed below, institutional work by managers was evident, but ineffective compared to the efforts of professionals, as detailed below.
Cluster 3: Organizing for radical innovation through political work
The Cluster 3 cases (Raffi and Dragan) experienced multiplicity and ambiguity of institutionalized interests that stimulated tolerance towards practice/boundary revision. The increasing promotion of multidisciplinary work from practice communities to which doctors were strongly attached, and growing interest of doctors in becoming 'clinical leaders' and 'first movers' in the field breached the stabilizing effects of institutional interests toward compartmentalized care. Hospital managers sought to exploit the receptive context with a strategy that could achieve quick results in terms of ICP development, without intruding upon clinicians' jurisdiction. Executives and quality managers both recognized they lacked expertise and clinical authority to demand use of ICP methods to redesign clinical services. This strategy was organized in two steps: (i) initiatives that institutionalized new interests, norms and beliefs, allowing professionals to experiment with multidisciplinary working and standardized care; (ii) initiatives that reinforced institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs, orienting the professionals' agency towards ICP development. Hereafter, the Cicero case is presented in detail.
In the first step, executives did not enact any political work; e.g. linking ICP development to special status or resources for professionals, after failed attempts in the past. The proliferation of experiments across clinical departments signaled increasing erosion of boundaries and the institutionalization of interests, norms and beliefs related to multidisciplinary care. This experimental stage was "long and slow" (Cicero, Executive Manager). As noted by an executive manager in Martin:
It is like planting season. It takes time and luck. You plant your seeds, and pray to God that the soil is fertile and that no flood or storm will ruin the harvest. And you wait. You patiently wait for the seeds to grow because you cannot really force the soil to produce results immediately. (Martin, Executive Manager)
In Cicero, managers had "prepared the soil" over the years and could use structures (such as Cicero Learning) created and developed over decades of constant revision. In this respect, "time was a gentleman" (Cicero, Quality Manager) because it had allowed professionals to develop their own understanding of and response to integrated care.
On the downside, the experimental stage had produced very different results, since professional groups pursued their individual interests and understandings of integrated care.
Only few radical innovations were pursued and the coalition felt the need to more systematically organize service innovation.
We couldn't find one single product that all groups produced. ICPs seemed a particularly smooth way to organize work but they were rare and were so different from each other. We wanted to channel these efforts in a more systematic way. (Cicero, Quality Manager) Consequently, a second and faster step of institutional work was enacted to consolidate the nascent interests, norms and beliefs, and orient the professionals toward service redesign in a more sustained way. To guarantee the sustainability of Care Centers, middle managers enacted the embedding work needed to preserve professionals' continued engagement and a constant flow of resources for new work and personnel. They followed many "small little things" (Cicero, Quality Manager) that professionals were less attuned to managing; e.g., schedules, amending communication systems, following developments of research proposals for additional grants.
Discussion
In the face of potential professional resistance, the study reveals four strategies used by managers to organize their expert workforce for radical innovation. Three were relatively ineffective; i.e. allow full autonomy to professionals (Cluster 1); use centralized project management (Cluster 2); enact persuasive institutional work through extrinsic motivators (Cluster 3). The fourth was however effective; i.e. a cross-level and two-step strategy of institutional work (Cluster 4 cases). Henceforth, the four strategies are compared, following which a theoretical model of institutional work for radical innovation in professional organizations is outlined (Table 3) .
<<Table 3 about here>> Discussion will focus upon Cluster 3 and 4 cases, to compare institutional work strategies for successful realization of radical innovation. In both Clusters the stabilizing effects of institutional influences around professionalism were softened by new institutionalized interests, norms and values, around clinical innovation leadership and first-mover advantage.
The multiplicity, heterogeneity and/or ambiguity of interests, norms and values stimulated a tolerance for boundary/practice revisions. These micro-institutional affordances were perceived by executives, quality managers, and reforming doctors as an opportunity for radical innovation. Executives and quality managers in Cluster 3 cases performed 'political work' (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) , using incentives to make professionals prioritize the radical innovation. In Raffi and Dragan, however, this achieved sub-optimal outcomes because the new regulations and incentives intruded upon professionals' jurisdiction. Quality managers' hands-off approach to project management added ambiguity to their request for radical innovation. Professionals were engaged by (but not in) the political work, did not understand managers' motives for change, and were unprepared for integrated care, so their response was to 'shut down' their early tolerance and protect established boundaries and practices. Professional groups that adopted ICP-based methodologies did so in ways that legitimized only incremental innovation, or even reaffirmed the status quo. The political work enacted by executives and quality managers created ambiguity around adoption of ICP methods. So, professional groups used ICP methods as the end point to legitimize decisions that had already been made locally. Overall, the institutional work in Cluster 3 decoupled managers from doctors, since the former developed new regulations that pushed for ICPs without following up their implementation in practice; while the latter had exclusive jurisdiction regarding interpretation of the new regulations without having shaped their content. In essence, executive and quality managers attempted to channel professional responses toward an established (and ultimately exogenous) ICP standard. In doing so, these cases had worse outcomes than Cluster 2 cases. In Cluster 2, the lack of cultural and technical work was such that the radical innovation was not at the top of professional priorities.
However, quality managers' practical support stimulated professionals to, at least, experiment with new boundaries and practices. Furthermore, Cluster 3 cases also achieved worse outcomes than Cluster 1 cases because the professionals' rejection of new regulations and incentives created tension with managers.
In contrast, two-step institutional work within Cluster 4 cases proved effective (see Figure   1 ). In Cluster 4, institutionalized interests, norms and beliefs of professionalism mingled with interests to gain first mover advantage, and through innovation leadership to advance organizational and individual prestige. This multiplicity and heterogeneity of institutionalized interests generated micro-institutional affordances that stimulated more tolerance for ICPrelated experiments.
In the first step within Cluster 4, with the support of quality managers, early adopting doctors led technical/cultural work to increase attachment of professional peers to integrated care; executives led political work to create a favorable regulative and structural context for local experiments. With more diluted boundaries, the second step of institutional work consolidated the notion that ICP methods should inform radical service redesigns. Executives and quality managers developed coalitions with doctors that exerted hierarchical and professional authority over the latter's peers. Thus, institutional work was not directed by executives and quality managers towards professionals, but by a cross-level coalition of 'reformers' towards 'defenders' in clinical departments. This institutional work was internally coherent because executives, quality managers and 'reforming' professionals The two-step approach was crucial to organize professionals for radical innovation. The initial technical/cultural work prepared the ground by emphasizing existing norms/beliefs about innovation leadership and professional prestige. Executives and quality managers worked institutionally to emphasize multiplicity of institutional demands (Van Dijk et al., 2011) , reaching a point where professionals perceived the need to find ways to balance these.
Professionals were allowed to 'inhabit' (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006) This reveals a scenario -relevant and yet underestimated in more 'traditional' firms -in which managers cannot really grant autonomy to professionals (who already self-regulate and control their operations), and cannot fully rely on incentives since these may not align with existing practice. The cases reveal that innovation was informed by more profound transformation in institutionalized interests, values and beliefs that have consolidated over the years. Attempts to grant "additional" autonomy or incentives without a proper revision of these institutional pillars are likely to produce inconsistent results. Building upon this general finding, the study provides three specific insights to extant literature on radical innovation.
First, the institutional work perspective details the nature of defenders' resistance to radical innovation. Most models of change emphasize how the first action for 'reformers' is to 'unfreeze' (Lewin, 1951 ) the organization from the status quo. Regulations, social norms, culture and cognitive frameworks are highlighted as relevant contingencies that make an organization unwilling or incapable of advancing radical innovation (Buchanan et al., 2005; Paton and McCalman, 2008) . Institutional theory suggests that these represent the basis of legitimacy, coercion and compliance that inhibit the 'free' agency of embedded actors, such as managers and professionals (Scott, 2001 ). The institutional work perspective adds a further insight; i.e. it shows how embedded actors do not just comply with the institutional pressures, but actively work to maintain the status quo. Our study shows how 'defenders' do not resist the radical change per se (e.g., several professionals were indeed positive that integrated care was a worthwhile idea), but the implications that the change would have on institutionalized
interests (e.g., changes to reimbursement mechanisms), norms (e.g., changes in jurisdictions and autonomy) and values (e.g., changes to effectiveness and risks around care). Hence, the 'institutional work' perspective can enumerate the tactics through which 'defenders' resist innovation, by "unpacking" actions that are oriented at towards reinforcement of institutionalized norms and cognitive frameworks (i.e., technical work), local attachment to these institutional pillars (i.e., cultural work), and production of incentive systems and rules that reward certain behaviors over others (i.e., political work). The present study thus shows how the 'struggle' between 'reformers' and 'defenders' around radical innovation is framed by established institutional pillars and may generate new ones.
Second, executives, middle managers and professionals had key distinctive roles during the two-step institutional work. Extant research highlights radical innovation is more likely to succeed when cross-level 'dominant coalitions' are involved (Damanpour, 1991; Kotter, 1999) . The present study extends this by highlighting how the coalition might work internally to pursue institutional work. Professionals' jurisdictions remained fundamentally inaccessible to executive and middle managers, so only professionals act as 'institutional carriers' of normative and cultural/cognitive pillars. Furthermore, early adopters played a key role in the institutional work strategy as they had the expert knowledge and professional background to make sense of how diverse institutional elements integrate, following which they could enact technical and cultural work (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) to shape new cognitive/normative foundations of change (Scott, 2001) . This was effective when professionals could keep managers at a distance in the earlier stages of institutional work, so that boundary and practice revisions could be negotiated between peers. By doing so, professionals did not feel their institutionalized interests were threatened by managerial interests. Also, professionals' technical and cultural work was particularly effective when encompassed within organizational structures such as Cicero Learning to which all professionals were already attached and in which educating and theorizing (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) was tolerated.
In contrast, executives were involved in organizing radical innovation mostly through ratifying behaviors and outcomes (necessary for professionals to increase their organizational status) and structuring rules and regulations (necessary to obtain resources and facilities). In doing so, they engaged primarily with political forms of institutional work. Executives were unwilling to act without professional support, either leaving the responsibility for radical innovation entirely to professionals; or limiting themselves to co-creating structures for the co-option of local interests (e.g., Care Centers). They linked with high-status professionals to legitimize their involvement, create coherence in the face of institutional multiplicity (Van Dijk et al., 2011) , and engage with the cognitive/normative assumptions held by professionals within specific clinical departments. Attempts to enact political work without professional links failed (cf. Raffi and Dragan). So, executive managers' role, although crucial, depends on three contingencies: (i) their consciousness that micro-institutional affordances reduce risk that frontline professionals resent their intrusion; (ii) possibility to liaise with clearly identifiable local professional groups; (iii) support of middle managers as lynchpins to engage with professionals at the frontline (Currie and Procter, 2005 These changes require structured tactics of 'small wins' that expand the pool of supporters across the organization (Kotter, 1999; Reay et al., 2006) . The present study emphasizes how 'small wins' were carried out primarily in terms of technical and cultural work; i.e. small wins did not just promote ICP methodology, but drove changes in deeper rules of legitimacy and compliance within the organization, hence were carried out primarily by the 'early adopting' professionals along with middle managers. The model induced from the present study has a fundamental difference with other models of change, for which promoting 'small wins' serve the purpose of diffusing the radical innovation across the system; i.e. increase the number of adopters and supporters. In the present study, the first step of institutional work does not promote the radical innovation per se since other professionals could be fundamentally and legitimately indifferent to it. Rather, the 'small win' needed to celebrate the ICP methodology underpinning radical innovation, so that other professional groups could use that example to develop radical innovation in their own disciplinary areas. Thus, 'small wins' in the study are aimed at changing the normative and cognitive bases of legitimacy in the organization; i.e. validating applications of ICP methods to redesign services to enhance effectiveness of care and reduce clinical risk. This institutional perspective also explains why professionals (and particularly high-status doctors) led the small wins while middle managers took the back-seat. As noted earlier, only professionals controlled the institutional carriers connected to normative and cognitive pillars, hence their role in the coalition is central from the very beginning. The 'small wins' matured into a broader institutionalization of change only when the presence of professionals in the coalition was significant enough to drive change in normative and cognitive pillars in the organization.
In Cicero, particularly, the second step originated when there was little doubt that clinical departments were engaged with integrated care and needed a "final stroke" (Cicero, Quality Manager). At this point, the political work enacted by executives (with middle managers and professionals on the back-seat) generated radical innovation. Political work consolidated nascent boundaries and practices; while the second stage of technical/cultural work oriented professionals more systematically towards ICP methods as the approach for radical innovation. This two-step institutional work strategy was then effective because it associated radical innovation with incremental institutional change processes through which managers emphasized an institutional dilemma (how to balance self-regulation and effectiveness with innovation leadership and professional prestige) and gave professionals time to make sense of how to integrate diverse institutional elements associated with professional organization and radical innovation. Radical innovation thus ceased to be incommensurate with established professional interests, norms and beliefs, and professionals spontaneously engaged with it.
Managerial Implications
This study investigated how managers organized a professionalized workforce for radical innovation. Our study highlighted how executive and middle managers drive radical innovation through developing cross-level coalitions and enacting two stages of institutional work. In driving radical innovation, managers drew upon the knowledge and influence of reforming professionals to change the vested interests, norms and logics that protected the status quo.
Our study provides more 'traditional' firms with relevant insights into how an expert workforce could be organized for radical innovation through examining experts' autonomy from a different perspective. Previous research commonly asked 'how much' autonomy should be granted to experts, and highlighted how it enhances their creativity. In contrast, our study shows what happens when autonomy is established in experts' life, and cannot be 'taken back'. In such situations, managers need to organize radical innovation by adapting to experts' autonomy and finding ways to challenge established interests, norms and values. Our study thus provides four key incations to managers on radical innovation.
First, our study highlights how the strength of institutionalized arrangements and professionals' institutional work constrained managerial actions to such an extent that executives would reinforce, rather than challenge, the status quo; and middle managers would refrain from any action when professionals perceive them as intrusive.
Second, our study shows when managers mediate professional organization to advance radical innovation, particularly how managerial action is dependent upon their recognition of 'micro-institutional affordances' (Van Dijk et al., 2011) .
Third, our study details the managerial actions to influence frontline professionals towards radical innovation. While centralizing decision-making through political work had considerable limits in realizing radical innovation, enacting gradual and collaborative institutional work proved successful, when complemented by professional experimentation with new practices and boundaries.
Fourth, our study emphasizes the importance of an institutional perspective in innovation management studies. Institutionalized arrangements are commonly seen to prevent radical boundary and practice revision. Our study highlights how managers can reconfigure regulative, normative and cognitive institutional pillars to enable professionals' enactment of radical innovation. Arguably, these findings can be transferred to any context where institutional arrangements and workforce autonomy inhibit managers' organization of radical innovations. Professionalization dynamics have become increasingly relevant in contemporary firms where professionals, such as R&D employees, scientists, designers, software developers, claim autonomy and self-regulation derived from the use of their unique knowledge and skills (Muzio et al., 2013) , and use it to influence the nature and extent of radical innovation.
In summary, our study suggests that managers can support the introduction of radical innovation by first, developing stable alliances with local professional groups to provide cognitive/normative foundations of radical innovation; second, allowing professionals to inhabit nascent institutional arrangements and to make sense of how these fit with their prevailing interests, norms and beliefs; third, co-developing structures/rules that encourage professionals to pursue radical innovation; and finally performing maintenance work that preserves professionals' attachment to new institutions. Our study also emphasizes the need to develop systems that identify micro-institutional affordances. Middle managers appear particularly well positioned to do this, as they are close to frontline professionals, and so can relate to multiple, heterogeneous and ambiguous institutional interests held by different actors (Van Dijk et al., 2011) .
Limitations & Future Research
The study calls for more research linking institutional constructs with radical innovation and presents the opportunity to explore how micro-institutional affordances emerge (Van Dijk et al., 2011) . Furthermore, previous research highlights that managers' social position and other individual characteristics explain decisions made about their pursuit of strategic initiatives (Lockett et al., 2014; Mantere, 2008) . Further research might assess in greater detail when and why managers tend to select strategies of institutional work to support radical innovation.
Finally, we recognize limitations of our study to highlight a need for future research. First, our study relied methodologically on comparative case study to contrast different approaches to radical innovation. Comparative case studies are positioned in a grey area between the indepth analysis of single case studies and the statistical generalization of surveys (Miles and Huberman, 1994) . Second, the results stem from a hospital setting. While the authors believe the analysis is generalizable to other contexts characterized by expert knowledge, further research to examine whether the analysis can be applied to other settings is encouraged. 
